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Supply Limit
Figure 1 demonstrates how prices am-c determined in an economy that is closed to inter-national tn'ade and how supply controls can incn'ease the price of a good above its free market level. The supply curve, labeled 5, rises upward and to the n-ight, indicating that producers will supply larger quantities of a good as its pr-ice is incr-eased. 'i'he short-run demand cun've, labeled D,, slopes downward to show that consumers will buy smaller quantities of a good as its pr-ice r-ises. In a free market, the intersection rif the supply and demand curves at point A determines that the price would be P while the quantity supplied would equal the quantity demanded, at Q. Since the quantity of the good supplied to the marker at that price exactly satisfies consumer-demand, neither producer-s nor consumers have an incentive to change their' pr-oduction or consumption patternsBy imposing a supply limit at Q,, the pr-ice can be increased fi-om P, to P,. This would benefit producers, however-, only if it increased their profits. Since production declines, the total costs incurred by producers will decline also. As long as total revenue is not reduced by an amount larger than the reduction of total costs, profits will rise.
The change in total n-evenue resulting fi'om a price change depends upon the pr-ice elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of the quantity demanded to a change in price. If the quantity of a product demanded changes proportionately less in absolute value I than the change hi price, the demand is r-eferred to as inelastic.
Since a I per-cent increase in pr-ice causes less than a 1 percent decn'ease in quantity demanded when domand is inetastic, the price inicr-ease causes total n'ev'enue to incnease. Conver-sety, a pnice decr'ease causes total revenue to decrease when demand is inelastic. The effects on total r'evenue of tin-ice changes ar'e i-evem-sed when demand is elastic. Elastic demand exists when the quantity of a product demanidedi changes pi-opon-tionatelv more in alisolute valuel than the change in pr-ice. Since a 1 per-cent ir'icn'ease in pi'ice causes a more than 1 per-cent decm-ease in quantity demanded when demand is elastic, the pn-ice incn-ease causes total n-ex.'enue to decrease. Conversely, a pr-ice decrease causes total r-evenue to increase when tIemand is elastic. A final possibility, known as unitary elasticity, is that a 1 per-cecil change in price leads tn a 1 percent change in quantity demanded, which has no effect on total revenue. in figure 1, the supply contn'oh, which n-educed the quantity supplied flom Q, to Q,, appear-s to have causedi the price approximately to douhile from P to P 2 . The quantity demanded, however', appear-s to have decreased much less. In other-won'ds, the demaridi is considered to be inelastic in that price r-ange. When the demand fun-a product is inelastic, a supply contr-ol pr-ogram incr-eases the total n-evenue of producer's. Since, total costs wilt have fallen also, profits must increase.
When the demand for-a pr-odluct is elastic,a supply control pn'ogm-am would reduce the quantity tiemanded pr-opor-tionately mon-c than the price increase. 'the reduction in total revenue makes it possible that the supply contr'ol program could lead to r-educed pmofits. In general, a supply contn'oI pn'ogr-am is beneficial to producers facing an inelastic demand.
A variety of factors influence the elasticity of demand for a pm-oduct. One of the most impomtant of these is the availability of substitutes for-the product. A product's demand is more likely to be elastic if acceptable substitutes for that pmoduct exist. For example, the price elasticit of beef likely exceeds that of gasoline because there are numen'ous substitutes for' beef while then-ear-c few substitutes for gasoline. Another' extremely important influence on demand elasticity is time-In the short r-un, a pr'oduct's demand is generally less elastic than over the tong run because consumers find substitutes on-learn to conserve on the consumption of the product over' time. Demand becomes more elastic the toriger the time period as 2 01 Quantity 
Rest of the World
consumer's readjust their-consumption patterns. 4 Figure 1 portrays the effect of changes in demand elasticity over time. 'The curve DL portrays the long-run demand curve for the product and is much flatter than the short-n-un demand curve D,. This reflects the greater-elasticity that is common over the long r'un. The supply control that resulted in the doubling of prices from P, to P, in the short run is markedly less beneficial to producers oven' the tong run. In this case, the imposit ion of the supply restraint has a relatively small effect on the price, raising it only to P,. Furthermore, ft appears that the total m-evenue has declined through the use of the controls. The short-mn strate~' that appear-ed to increase profits may lead to lower future profits if the tong-run demand becomes etastic.
THE ECONOMICS OF SUPPLY CONTROLS IN AN: OPEN ECONOMY
So far, we have focused on a simple economy without international tr'ade to illustrate fundamental points about supply control programs. This section expands that analysis to include supply controls in a wom'id economy with trade. The addition of tm-ade to the analysis implies: Ii that a product may be pro-'For example, Houthakker and Taylor (1966) estimated the long-run price elasticity for gasoline at .7, while the short-run elasticity was estimated to be much more inelastic at -.2. duced in countries outside of the country (orgn-oup of countries attempting to increase n-etur-ns through a supply control poticy, and 2) that the controlled good can be traded between countries. tn a closed economy, a product's price is determined solely by domestic supply and demand. With the addition of trade, price determination occurs in the world rather than domestic market. Ignoring transportation costs, the equilibrium price for both the domestic economy and the rest of the worid is P,~. In this case, the equilibrium price is above what the domestic price would have been in a closed economy. According to panel A, at the world price, domestic producers supply a larger quantity Q,,I than domnestic consumer's are wilting to purchase QD.~. The difference between these two is exported to the rest of the world where, at DLV' consumers demand a larger quantity (Q,,,) The loss of shares of world production and trade is a predictable outcome of a supply control measure. White an exporting countny might pn-efer not to lose its shares of world pn'oduction and trade, it is more likely to accept these losses if the supply contm-ots n-esult in higher' returns to producers. In figure 2, it appear-s that returns would be increased in the short run because the inelastic won-Id demand curve and the inelastic foreign supply curve result in higher total revenue for domestic producers.' These short-run retur-ns will er-ode, however, because the pr-ice elasticities of both demand amid supply increase over time. A given domestic supply control results in a smaller' price increase in the long run than in the short run. This effect is even more pronounced with international trade because the elasticity of fureign, as well as domestic, supply goner-ally increases over time. In the short run, producer's are unable to respond fully to a price increase because the capital base used for production is fixed -Over a longer period, producers can incr-ease output by adding production capacity, improving technoto~' andi adopting new technology. This hong-run foreign supply m-esponse contributes to the dectine in the share of world pn'oduction and trade of the domestic country by increasing fbreign production and, in the process, reducing the demand for' the domestic countr's exports. The foreign supply m-esponse becomes increasingly more imnpor-tant because of the gm-owing fbm-eign share of womtd production.
'The example of OPEC is instructive at this point. When OPEC reduced production as a means of increasing the price of crude oil, it was logical to expect that its share of both oil exports and production would fall. While its share fell, it was able to greatly increase its returns because of the elasticities of world demand and supply. With a lack of acceptable energy sources as substitutes, the world demand for crude oil was extremely inelastic. The world supply of oil also was extremely inelastic because of the small share of world production held by non-OPEC countries and the difficulty, expense and time required to find and tap new oil reserves. If non-OPEC countries had been able to expand production easily and quickly in response to higher prices, the price increases would not have been as great.
In summary, the intr-oduction of international tm-ade makes the decision to use supply control measures dependent on the elasticity of won-Id demand arid world supply. It is iriipon'tant to note that, while the elasticity of foreign (rest-of-the-world) supply is important, it is the entine world's elasticity of supply that determines if a domestic supply control program wilt be effective. For example, for'eign supply may he very elastic over a small marige; but if for'eign production repm-esents only a small share of total world pn-oductiori, the domestic supply conti-ol pn-ogram may still be very profitable. This is true because the foreign supply response, while very elastic, may tiave only a small effect on the tnital quantity supplied in the world if domestic production dwarfs foreign pn-oduction. A natural consequence of domestic supply controls and foreign supply elasticity, however-, is an increase in the foreign share nif world pn-oduction and a r'esuiting increase in the won-id supply elasticity.
THE ORIGINAL TOBACCO PROGRAM
The cur-rent toliacco pn'ogn-ani has its roots in the farm legislation of the 1930s known as the Agricultural Adjustment Act AAA). This legislation used pr-odmrction controls on most agricultural pm-oducts as a means of iricm'easing prices. Of the nurlier-ous supply contn'ot pn'ogr-ams proposed in the original AAA legislation, only the tobacco and peann.nt programs have maintained direct production contriils.
'the tobacco pr'ogr-am functioned, and continues to ftrriction, by fim'sI establishing a support priceY Initially, fan-men-s were assigned allotments that indicated the number (if acm-es of tobacco each farmer could cultivate. tn the 1960s and T970s, the acreage allotmerits were supplemented with marketing quotas that limited the ntrmber-of pounds of tobacco each far-mer could sell. These quotas were based on estimates of the quantity that could be sold at the sinpport pr-ice.
The price support mechanism has changed (inly slightly riven' time. Initially, if a farmer did not receive an offer-gn-eater than the support price, the government purchased the farmer's tobacco amid held it until it could be sotd at the support price. Imi the 1940s, a system of grower-s cooper-atives was om-ganized mci pun'-chase and hold the surplus tobacco. The coopen-atives received, and continue to receive, govem-nment financing.
'From its inception in the 1 930s until 1985, the tobacco support price was based on a "parity index" which measures the ratio of prices received by farmers to prices paid by farmers. The parity ratio is typically criticized for having no relationship to market prices.
Fom a long pem'iod, the tobacco progr'ani was considen-ed extn-emely successful. The price of U.S. tobacco continued to rise, and the program was n.m at little cost to the government. In addition, the quota rights to grow and sell tobacco were marketable; in fact, they genera ted as much as 5800 million per year in income for quota owners? It is, in part, because of the apparent success of the tobacco pnogram that interest in supply contmois has resurfaced for-other-crops.
'the tobacco progn-am's ability to endure while generating substantial wealth thmough the sale and leasing of quotas was attributable to the inelastic nature of both world demand and supply of tobacco. The major reason fur the inelastic supply m-esponse was that the United States held a large share of the worid's production amid sales of particular varieties of tobacco.' As recently as the 1950s, the United States produced more than 80 pen-cent of the world's burtey tobacco.
It is imiipomtant to note that the US. dominance in tobacco production and the inelasticity of world supply were even greater when one considers the important distinction of tobacco quality. Owing to special soil and climatic conditions and growing experience, U.S. tobacco generally was regarded to be of unmatched quality." This further differentiated it from tobacco grown in other countries. If other countries were unalile to gm-ow super-ion' quality tobacco even as its pm-ice increased, the supply of that tobacco would be considered perfect~inetastic. Perfectly inelastic supply means that the quantity supplied woutd not change when the price changed.
The demand for-tobacco, in general,was also inelastic. One source estimated the intermediate-run demand elasticity of tobacco at -.t and the long-r-un elasticity at 5. "The major reason for the inelastic nattnn'e of tohiacco demand is the lack of substitutes. The addictive riatur-e of tobacco fun'ther neduces sensitivity to pnice changes. Furthermore, tobacco pun'- 'Sumner and Alston (1985) , p. 13. The U.S. General Accounting Office study found that, although farmers were the intended beneficiaries of the tobacco program, 68 percent of quota owners were not active farmers. By using supply controls, U.S. tobacco producer-s initially ean'ned higher incomes. Whihe the quantity of tobacco marketed fetl, the nestnhting pt-ice increase was large enough to cause the total revenue n-eceived by quota owner's and tobacco gr-owers to increase. Because of the higher pnice, U.S. exports fell as foreign consumers reduced the amount of tobacco pun-chased at the higher price. Foreign supplier's responded to the higher price by producing hanger quantities of tobacco.
SOME LONG-TERM TRENDS
The supply and demand analysis suggested that the adoption of a supply control policy would lead to both a reduction in U.S -production and a smaller U.S -sham-c of world tn'ade and world pn'oduction. An examination of tobacco pmoduction and quota trends documents the hong-term process of n-educing the domestic tobacco industry as a means of maintaining the price suppom't mechanism. Chart I tracks the production of tobacco in the tjnited States against the production of tobacco in the rest of the won-Id over the past 30 years. It shows that domestic production, though yan'iable, has been tn-ending downward while foreign tobacco pr-oduction has gm-own steadily. Since 1966, domestic tobacco production has fallen by 38.8 percent, while foreign pi-oduction has grown by 56.5 percent.
A longer-term pem'spective on the inupact of the tobacco program restrictions cami be gained by examining act-cage data. The tobacco pn-ogr-am initially attertnpted to contn-ot production solely by n-estnicting the number of acres that farmer's could gn-ow. Chart 2 shows the long-temm tn-end of failing acreage allotment s.'' As yields increased, acm-cage limitations became less effective in contm-ohhing production arid wer-e augmented by marketing quotas that limited the numben' of pounds of tobacco farmer's coinid market. Chart 3 shows the trend of falling marketing quotas for' fluecured and burley tobaccos, the two varieties that account for-90 percent of all domestic tobacco produc-"Although not shown in the graph, tobacco acreage in 1986 was at its lowest point since 1874 as a result of the supply control program.
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Chart I limdez   10 tion. The chart shows that, after' initially m'ising, poundage quotas for these two tobaccos generally have been decreasing in the 1980s.
U.S. and Foreign Tobacco Production
As indicated earlier', a reduction in the U.S. shan-es of won'hd tobacco production and total expon-ts is an expected nesuht of the supply restriction. Table 1 documents these share losses. For example, in the 1955-59 peniod~the United States accounted for-more than 80 percent of the world's production of burley tobacco. By 1985, the U.S. shane of bun'tey production had fallen to 38 tiercent. Similar' ti-ends are evident for flue-cured tobacco and for the category labeled "alt tobacco."
Not only have the U.S. shames of world pn'oduction and trade fallen, but the use of iniponted tobacco has nisen substantially (see table 2 ). Until the 1970s, the use of imported burley and flue-cur-ed tobacco was negligible. tn 1969, hess than 1 percent of all bumtey tobacco used in the United States was imported. By 1985, imports accounted for more than 24 per'cent of all burley use. Other-varieties not pn'oduced in this country, such as Oriental tobacco, continually have been imported fOr blending purposes.
Another-important tn-end is the reduction of the quality advantage that U.S. tobacco holds Over' foreign tobacco. Numerous sour'ces assert that the quality gap between foreign and domestic tobacco is nan-n-owing." This reflects the fact that attempts to inc.rease the price of high-quality tobacco have provided foreign producers with an incentive to imnprove the quality of their tobacco. The result ofa smaller quality advantage amid rising prices has hed, predictably, to the loss of both domestic and foneign mam-kets for U.S. tobacco.
Over time, the demand for tJ.S.-pn-oduceci tobacco has become nnon'e elastic as other soun'ces of supphv from the n-est of the wom-id have appear-ed. The elastic-" Starkey (1985) , p.50 and U.S. General Accounting Office (1982), p. 18. Harvested Acreage of Burley and Flue-Cured Tobacco ity of supply also has mci-eased. In the short run, foreign tobacco pm-oducers were limited in their m-esponse to higher-tin-ices by their hand base and other factors such as the knowhedge and technolo~'needeci to produce highen'-quality tobacco. With time, however-, foreign pn-oducers have acquired these additional inputs. The result has been a dramatic increase in the quantity of tobacco supplied by the nest of the world. As a consequence, the impact of U.S. tobacco policy on world tobacco markets has declined.
Although the long-r-un benefits of supp~control policies may lie in question for-11.5. tobacco farmen-s, beniefits for foreign producer-s am-C obvious. 'these benefits an'e confer-red in two ways. First, by n-estn'icting the supply of U.S. tobacco initially thn'ough quotas amid later through the maintenance (if the loani stocks by tue gm-owen's' coopenatives, a higher won-Id price is maintained. Second, the program creates a strong incentive for foreign producers to improve the quality of their' tobacco by maintaining a higher' pm-ice in the market fon high-quality tobacco than would othemM'ise resultNone of these tong-term tn-ends of decreasing production, falling quotas or falling U.S. siiares, however, wem-e cause for concer'n. The purpose of supp~con-trols was to n'aise the commodity's price and, more importantly, to n'aise the net revenue of fan-men-s. For many yean's the tobacco pr'ogn'am was successful in thus respect.
Over a recent pen-iod, however', the pm-ogram led to tower' mevenues fOr tobacco grower's. From 1982 to 1985, the poundage allotments for but-Icy tobacco fell by 30.4 percent. Over this same period, however', the ayerage price paid to growers for burley felt by 11.9 percent. 'l'he combination of lower' output and lower price translated into a 38.7 per-cent decline in tobacco m-eceipts for-bum'ley fan-men-s.
RECENT PROGR'%M DEVELOPMENTS AND CHANGES
In the 1980s, the tobacco Iimice support mechanism led to major problems. The tobacco price support was, In exchange for the gover-nment's n-escue, tobacco far-mers accepted lower support prices. Because of the tower' prices, the assessmenuts fell to Only 2 cerrts per pound. The United States Department of Agriculture USDAI also was given incn-eased fn-eedom to n-educe tobacco pnces further if needed and was permitted to use a more market-oriented method of calculating suppor't pr-ices and setting quotas."
The new tobacco pn-ogn-arn has n-esulted in substantially lower prices. 'the average tobacco pn'ice paid to gn'owen-s fell from $1.80 pen-pound in 1985 to $1.45 per pound in 1986. As a result, tobacco exports rose in 1987. Imports also fell and now represent a smaller share of the tobacco used in the United States. Man'keting quotas also have been increased in anticipation of growing sales.
(IAN SUPPLY CON'TROLS BE USED EFFECTIVELY ON OTHER CROPS?
The initial success of the tobacco program's use of supply controls can be attributed to supply and demand chan-acteristics that ar-c not pn-esent for' other major crops. The tobacco program benefited fn-om the fact that the demanid for' U.S. tobacco was inelastic because of a lack of a good substitute. Additionally, the won'td supply was inelastic because the United States held a dominant share of the won-Id's pn-oduction.
"The support price formerly had been determined by a combination of the parity index and limits set by the Secretary of Agriculture. Tobacco support prices currently are determined by a formula using five-year moving averages of tobacco prices and year-to-year changes in costs of production. This approach is substantially more "market-oriented" than the previous method, which was driven by costs of numerous products unrelated to the open market for tobacco. The USDA determines tobacco quotas based on three factors. The first factor is the intended purchases of tobacco by cigarette manufacturers based on the support price. Cigarette manufacturers must provide these estimates and purchase a minimum of 90 percent of their stated intentions or face a penalty. The remaining two factors are the average tobacco exports of the past three years and an estimate of the quantity of tobacco needed to maintain tobacco stocks at desired levels.
Most, if not all, other-majon crops do not enjoy these clianacten-istics.
For example, if the United States were successful in restn-icting the production of con-ni and raising its market price, consumen-s would most likely switch to any of the numerous crian-se gi-ains such as ban'Iey, sot'-ghum, millet on-oats, which an-c acceptable substitutes fon many of the feed uses of conni. On an international level, the U.S. share of the won-Id's coarse grains is small. If it were to impose sinpplv controls on corn, it would be necessary to n-estr-ict gr-eatlv the importation of fon'eign grain that would occun' in n-espouse to higher U.S. prices. Such tnade nestn-ictionis might negatively affect the ability to export other U.S. commodities.
In some cn-ops, the United States does have a lan-ge share of the world's production. Because of the availability of substitutes, howeven-, supply r'estriction would be ineffective. The United States, for example, pn-oduces rrnor'e than half of the world's soybeans. Unfortunately fon' advocates of supply controls, othien crops like con-n, coconut anid cotton seed can he substituted for soybeans as inputs for edible oil production.
An additional factor-n-estn'icting the potential use of supply controls for othen' crops is the won-Id elasticity of supply of these crops. Most cr'ops for which supply contn'ols have been considered in the United States can be produced throughout the world. Wheat, for' example, is pn-oduced in nnore than 100 countn'ies. If the United States were successful in r-aisirig wheat prices by reducing production, other wheatpn-oducing countries would be able to respond quickly by incn-easing production while the non-wheatpnoducing countries would have incentives to begin to pr'oduce wheat.
SUMMARY
controlling the supply of agricultural pnoducts has received attention n'ecently as a possible solution to the problem of falling far'm prices and growing cornmodity surpluses. The original tobacco program provides an insight inito the likely effects of such fanm policy changes. The tobacco program enjoyed initial success because of unique characteristics of the supply of and demand for' tobacco. The man-ket power' of the United States in the won-Id tobacco rnan'ket, howeven, has decreased over time as supply and demand elasticities and the foreign shane of world pnoduction have increased. To a lan-ge extent, the decline in man--ket powen-can he attributed to US. policy actions. tn response to this decline, the supply control program has been altened to he more market-oriented in setting support pr'ices. The othien niajor cnops for which supply contnol legislation has been pnoposed do not have the necessary supply and demand characteristics needed to successftnlly impose a supply contn-ol pn'ogn-am, even in the sliont term.
